1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
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4	TO DO DI THE NAMED CACES. Coop No. 16 10444
5	In Re FLINT WATER CASES Case No. 16-10444
6	
7	/
8	STATUS CONFERENCE
9	
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11	JULY 19, 2023
12	
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July 19, 2023

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1	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
2	THE CLERK: Calling the Flint Water Cases.
3	THE COURT: Great. And I think Jeseca has all of th
4	appearances on the record, so we can dispense with that.
5	And this is the time we set aside for a status
6	conference in the ongoing Flint water litigation. And I have
7	an agenda of four items.
8	And the first was Veolia's request to address the
9	Court regarding the outstanding Bellwether III home
10	inspections. And at our conference on June 13, I think at
11	that time I learned that there were still two homes where two
12	of the Bellwether III plaintiffs had resided for several
13	years. And VNA had made some efforts to gain access to those

And then in July 19, we had agreed that today would be the day that we'd tried to invite the individuals who live in those homes to discuss what their objection is and what they need to know about the process.

homes for four-hour or longer than four-hour inspections.

 $\,$ And I think, Mr. Olsen, you were going to subpoena them to be present.

MR. OLSEN: Yes, Your Honor. I'll just give you a brief update.

THE COURT: Brief.

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MR. OLSEN: As you just noted, we set this today to try to encourage cooperation for these home inspections. We

similarly had some difficulty serving them in person. They were avoiding that service. But we did serve them at their last and usual place of abode.

The good news is, one of the two homeowners did reach out to us and suggested they were willing to do the home inspection. And we're coordinating with them to accomplish that.

And what I would suggest, Your Honor, unless the other homeowner, Montaria Brown [sp], has joined us, which I suspect she hasn't, that we table this issue. We will continue our efforts.

But given the Court's comments last time and the hesitancy to do anything more strident, I would suggest we just leave this where it is. We will continue our efforts.

And if we think we need to schedule something in the future to get the Court's assistance, I would let you know.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'm looking now at the list of attendees who are not on the screen. And I don't see Montaria Brown, but I want to just look one more time. And I don't see any telephone numbers or anything like that or unusual names for who people might be. We see that sometimes. Cartoon characters and things of that nature. But I don't see that today.

So I think that's a good approach and I'm glad that you were able to meet with some success with at least one of

And so we'll just -- you'll continue to work on that.

And if you need my assistance, please let me know.

MR. OLSEN: Okay, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So next we have an ongoing issue that we've all become a little bit familiar with. Veolia has a request to address the production of the MATLAB source code.

So what's going on there?

MR. OLSEN: As you well know, we received a copy of the code that we did not think was readable. You gave plaintiffs two options. Either delivery a copy of that code to your clerk who had some experience with MATLAB, or coordinate a call between the two experts.

Mr. Stern thought that coordinating a call with the two experts was the right way to go. We had that call on June 28. I think that call was productive. Dr. Specht confirmed that he had the unencrypted MATLAB code. He could produce it. He had previously produced a one-time file that could perform the calculations but wouldn't show how those calculations were performed.

Now despite that call on the 28th and the indication that we could get a unencrypted readable source code, plaintiffs' counsel has not yet or Dr. Specht has not yet produced that code. They have suggested that Dr. Specht isn't available for deposition now until September. And they are

taking the position that they want to produce the code shortly before his deposition because they think we shouldn't have a lot of time in advance of the deposition with the code.

Our view obviously is the Court originally compelled plaintiffs to prove this code on March 8, more than four months ago. We negotiated a protective order that said as soon as we executed it we would get the code.

We don't see any reason or any basis to withhold the code now. In fact, once we get the code, we'll also need to verify whether Dr. Specht has provided sufficient raw data from his measurements to run the code and replicate those results. So there could be follow-up back and forth even after we get the code.

So we don't know why we don't have the code. We think we should get the code immediately.

THE COURT: So tell me a little bit more about the conversation between your expert and Dr. Specht.

MR. OLSEN: I wasn't on the call. But and
Mr. Ter Molen can correct me if I'm wrong. But my
understanding is that Dr. Hubert and Dr. Specht talked and
Dr. Specht suggested that, yes, that we did not get a copy of
the code to the extent we were looking for a copy of the code
to replicate all of his calculations. And he could provide an
unencrypted copy of the source code that would enable us to do
that.

THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Stern or Ms. Daly, would

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      you like to respond?
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               MS. DALY: Yes, Your Honor. I'll respond. So first,
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      I just want to give a little bit more light on the call
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     between Dr. Hubert and Dr. Specht because Mr. Ter Molen and
 6
     myself had the opportunity to be on that call. And the call
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     was very productive, as Mr. Olsen said. However, it didn't go
 8
     exactly as he summarized.
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               Dr. Hubert was very helpful and he explained to
     Dr. Specht and all of us that the initial protective order and
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11
      the agreement, which the attorneys had drafted and the Court
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     entered, did not specify what it was that he exactly needed,
13
     which he explained was -- and I don't -- I can't explain what
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     this means, but a source code.
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               So he explained that what Dr. Specht initially sent,
16
     he was not able to open. He was not able to use. And then he
17
      said what he needs is the source code. And then he went on to
18
     elaborate for Dr. Specht's benefit and all of our benefits
19
     what that meant to him, what that would look like.
                                                          So it was
20
     very helpful. We learned a lot.
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               Dr. Specht agreed that he could edit or for lack of a
22
     better word tinker with the format that he initially sent to
23
     best meet what Dr. Hubert explained he needed. And we have no
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I think that really this is a misunderstanding that

problem with Dr. Specht producing that.

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happened between lawyers drafting the agreement of what would be exchanged versus experts who understand the technical terms.

So that's the summary of what happened.

And then as to the deadlines, our position is not that we want to delay or that the code should be produced only a few days before the deposition.

Dr. Specht, since all of this has transpired, he has some family events, some travel coming up in the summer. Some happy things. He's getting married. And traveling to Asia. And I think his partner is from another part of the country. So there's a lot of travel involved. All that to say he won't be available for a deposition until September -- mid September. September 25.

And we just want to keep the integrity of the initial intervals contemplated by the scheduling order initially submitted by the Court and the scheduling order which the parties agreed to, specifically the May 25 scheduling order. So we just don't think that it's fair for there to be an extended interval of time between when the code and the reports are produced, and when the deposition of Dr. Specht is held, and then the following responsive defense expert reports.

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt and ask you what is your plan right now for when you would turn over the source

code and the underlying data?

MS. DALY: Yes, Your Honor. We had sent the defense counsel a proposed joint stipulation which contemplates that we would submit the code September 15. And then Dr. Specht would be deposed between September 25 and the 29th. And then the defendants, you know, corresponding expert report would be due October 9.

And that's -- that is keeping true to the 10 to 15-day intervals that we had all initially agreed to.

And I just would like to say one more thing. In the context of this, we have agreed to several deadline extensions for the defense expert reports responding to our experts of Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Krishnan. We submitted to the defendants those reports in February.

And our experts, our Group A experts, which again is Dr. Krishnan, Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Russell, they've all been deposed. And since then we've been agreed to several 30-day extensions, which we've had no problem with in the spirit of good faith and also in light of the Court's comments that the trial will be a little bit later than expected.

But as a result, the defense experts have really had the advantage of having our expert reports and having their depositions for much longer than was initially contemplated by the scheduling order submitted by the Court.

So really our concern here is just to keep the

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playing field level and not extrapolate on that advantage,
 2
     which the defense experts have already had. And then to the
 3
     extent that --
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               THE COURT: Tell me again, what is the origin of the
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     10 today -- 10 to 15-day lead time?
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                          It was agreed to in a joint stipulation
               MS. DALY:
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     that was entered on May 25. It's docket number --
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               THE COURT: Of this year?
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              MS. DALY: -- 2479.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Docket number what?
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              MS. DALY:
                          2479.
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               THE COURT: Okay. So what's wrong with that,
     Mr. Olsen?
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               MR. OLSEN: It doesn't make any sense.
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               THE COURT: Is it in that docket? I have to log on
16
     to the docket. I usually get -- I'm almost there.
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              MS. DALY:
                          In that docket, we had the June 1 deadline
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      for submitting the code. And then a following window for a
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     deposition that was June 12 to June 16. And then the defense
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      corresponding expert report following that June 26.
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               THE COURT: That's what I'm seeing as well.
                                                            So
22
     what's wrong with that?
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               MR. OLSEN: The reason those deadlines were set the
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     way those were set is we extended the deadlines to give us a
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     minimum amount of time to review the code because the code
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hadn't been produced.

It wasn't because there's some integrity issue with respect timing between preparation and review of the code and the expert depositions. The code was ordered to be produced months ago. They have the code. In fact, they produced what they called was a readable source code that wasn't.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. OLSEN: The notion that we need to wait until a couple weeks before the deposition to get the code, which is supposed to have been produced four months ago and just wasn't doesn't make any sense. And we may have follow-up requests. And we've seen how this has gone with respect to trying to get relevant data.

To just say because we thought there was a minimum of two weeks to read the code before means we shouldn't get the code until two weeks before the dep doesn't make sense.

THE COURT: Okay. So what I'll do is ask Ms. Daly to provide the code by September 5, the day after Labor Day. And that gives you about a month. So Mr. -- Dr. Specht can take care of his wedding and his family and get this to you all by September 5, giving you just about a month.

So now we have the next item on the agenda, which is Veolia's request to discuss the post January 2017 document production and the materials Veolia, oh, has designated as privileged. Is --

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MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, I think this issue got resolved in a meet and confer yesterday. So we can skip this one. THE COURT: I'm thrilled to hear that. Okay. So now let's look at the last item on our agenda, which is issues related to plaintiffs' fourth amended request for production as discussed at the May 17 conference. And what I wanted to do -- I sent an email yesterday that I wanted to start this agenda item by addressing the 60 documents that had been provided to me from among the 1,700 documents that Veolia had said or said were privileged. why don't we begin there. And so as everyone is aware, this is a dispute between the individual plaintiffs' counsel, Corey Stern and Melanie Daly, in this particular dispute, who were challenging the privilege designations on those 1,700 documents that would otherwise be responsive to plaintiffs' request for production of documents. So I asked to see 60 sample documents. selected by the plaintiffs, who, of course, had no idea what were in the documents but they have the descriptions on a

privilege log. And 30 selected by VNA.

Overall, as you know, the plaintiffs are challenging the privilege designations on most of these documents because they were provided to employees at two different public

relations firms. One of which I'm just going to refer to as Rasky. It has a more complicated corporate name. And the other I'll refer to as Mercury.

And with respect to the attorney-client privilege assertion, plaintiffs generally argued that VNA had waived the privilege when they provided these documents to employees at one or more of these PR firms.

And with respect to the attorney-client work product -- or the attorney work product privilege, plaintiffs argued that the documents are likely not privileged in the first place because their primary purpose or driving force -- and that comes from case law -- behind their creation was a media campaign and that they were not, in fact, created or related to obtaining legal advice or created to -- in anticipation of litigation or because of litigation for the attorney work product privilege to apply. And of course, VNA submitted and filed a letter brief indicating that all of the documents are privileged.

So I want to first invite plaintiffs to file your letter brief on the docket just so that the full briefing is there. So that will be your choice, but I invite you to do that.

And in order to make a decision and sort this out, I look to the law of the state where the litigation is taking place at the outset. And here Michigan courts have not had

many opportunities to weigh in on whether the privilege is waived when a client voluntarily shares otherwise attorney-client privileged documents and/or work product information with a third party PR firm. And neither has the Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to look at this in detail.

But that does not mean we're without guiding principles. Because these are well established privileges and have been addressed by courts all over the country.

So I want to start by lying at the attorney-client privilege assertion. And here the Reed Dairy Farm v Consumers Power Company, this is a Michigan Court of Appeals case from 1998, they set forth the scope of the attorney-client privilege in Michigan as follows.

The attorney-client privilege attaches to direct communications between a client and his attorney as well as communications made through their respective agents. The scope of the attorney-client privilege is narrow, attaching only to confidential communications by the client to his advisor that are made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.

Where an attorney's client is an organization, which is what we have here, the privilege extends to those communications between attorneys and all agents or employees of the organization authorized to speak on behalf of -- on its behalf in relation to the subject matter of the communication.

So we know in Michigan the key case on how a court should look at this in a company setting such as the one here comes from the Leibel v General Motors Michigan Court of Appeals case in 2002. And Leibel is L-e-i-b-e-l.

And Michigan follows the case we all look to, the Upjohn Supreme Court case to articulate viable principles underlying the rule, such as the purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and clients and thereby promote broader public interest, the broader public interest of observance of the law and administration of justice, and that sound legal advice or advocacy serves the public need that such advice and that it relies upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client.

We're reminded that waiver of privilege can present a mixed question of law and fact. And when analyzing whether a waiver has occurred, the Leibel court instructs that, first, the privilege is personal to the client and, therefore, only the client can waive it. And second, the privilege does not arise by accident.

And Michigan follows a true waiver requirement where, quote, unquote, "true waiver" is defined as an intentional voluntary act which cannot arise by implication. However, an error of judgment where the person knows that privileged information is being released but concludes that the privilege will never less -- nevertheless survive will still destroy any

privilege.

Once otherwise privileged information is disclosed to a third party, or if an otherwise confidential communication is necessarily intended to be disclosed to a third party, the privilege is gone.

So those are the general principles that I am applying on the attorney-client privilege.

Looking to the work product privilege here, any notes, working papers, memoranda, similar materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation are protected from discovery. And that still comes from the Leibel case.

And similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(3), Michigan Court Rule 2.302(B)(3)(a) provides nearly identical protections. So Michigan courts generally find that it's appropriate to rely on federal cases for guidance in determining the scope of the work product document -- or work product doctrine. Let me grab a couple -- one of those cases. Just a minute.

So this has been an interesting process to sort through. You can see that I have a lot here. There we go. He the primary -- when I look at the work product privilege, what I'm looking at is what is the primary purpose? What is the driving force for the creation of the document or the communication? Does it relate to a legal strategy? Or in our case, plaintiffs suggest that the appropriate question is,

does it relate to a media strategy?

If it's the latter, the document was never attorney work product in the first place, if it was created to further a media strategy and not a legal strategy even if lawyers are copied on the email or sent the email in the first instance. And even if the subject line of the email says attorney work product seeking legal advice in anticipation of litigation, none of that matters. What matters is what is the driving force for the creation of the document.

So VNA has urged in your letter brief that I should look to the case In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation out of the Southern District of New York for some direction. And that's with an excellent reason. That case shares some of the facts that are in common with our case.

There the Sumitomo Corporation was facing a scandal of sorts after one of its division heads disclosed certain things during a government investigation. He then hired a PR firm to handle the public relations consequences because the Sumitomo Corporation was located in Japan and they wanted media advice regarding western markets.

And ultimately the judge in that case ruled that the communications that took place with the PR firm that related to the litigation or were prepared in anticipation of litigation were, in fact, protected by attorney-client privilege and work product. This was because the court

determined that the PR firm was essentially acting as an employee of the party and, therefore, was within the group that would be considered the client seeking legal advice or that was in need of legal work product type documents.

But there's an important difference between that case and our case. In the In re Copper case, there was evidence that the PR consultant was what was called the functional equivalent of the client's employee.

For example, he was hired to consult intimately on a commercial and retail development project before the litigation was filed. He was involved on a daily basis with the client and would be the sole client representation at meetings with potential tenants and with local officials.

There was no one else from the Sumitomo Corporation present at that meeting -- at those meetings other than someone from the PR firm.

In addition, it was determined by the court that he possessed information that no one else at the company held.

And the court also held that there was no principle basis to distinguish the consultant's role from that of an employee of the client that was seeking legal advice.

Finally, the court found that the PR consultant was the type of person with whom a lawyer would wish to confer confidentially with in order to understand the reasons for seeking representation and how that representation would

develop.

VNA also pointed me to the case Grand Canyon Skywalk

Development LLC v Cieslak, C-i-e-s-k-l-a-k [sic] for the

rationale behind considering a public relations firm as a

functional employee or critical part of a legal strategy team.

And here I think VNA argued in your letter that employees of Rasky and Mercury were, in essence, part of the VNA litigation team.

There's little doubt -- and now I turn to the -- to what the court actually said in the Grand Canyon Skywalk case. The court said, "There's little doubt that Scutari and Cieslak" -- and those are the outside consultants -- "should be treated as the functional equivalent of an employee of the defendant or the client under the factors considered in the many cases the court had looked at.

In its opposition to the motion to quash the subpoena, Scutari and Cieslak indicated that they had been hired by the tribe through their lawyers to protect the name of the tribe and make it look more reasonable in the eyes of the public.

They methodically walked through we'll call them S and C. They had gone through every provision of contracts that the tribe had with Canyon Skywalk Development. They had focused on specific provisions and provided legal analysis establishing who was responsible for a visitor center and

certain portions of the litigation.

And they not only -- it was determined by the court that they not only served as a gatekeeper to the tribe, but also as the law firm that reviewed and approved the communications and public relations agreement eventually entered into between the tribe and a third party plaintiff.

So in that case, the consultant that's the third party that stands in the shoes that Rasky and Mercury do here was entire -- was used to review contracts and to determine what the responsibility was of the actual party to the litigation.

They undertook to provide general public relations services beyond this legal dispute. And they provided confidential legal communications with the lawyers on the case. And there it was determined they were within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. And their communications were protected from disclosure. And there are a number of other cases that were provided to me that I can go through.

But let me take a look at what the facts are that we know right now about these 60 documents. And as I mentioned earlier, they are generally copied to Rasky and/or Mercury. And so I asked -- having read a whole variety of cases, I asked VNA to file a copy of the contract with these two entities so I could understand whether they had become functional, whether they were seconded to or whatever word we

want to use. Whether they had become integrated into VNA's legal team, defending it in this litigation.

And although VNA could not locate a signed copy of those contracts and, in fact, could not locate any contract with Mercury -- and we'll set that aside for a minute.

With Rasky, VNA was able to locate an unsigned copy of the contract that you believe is the effective contract. So I'm just going to set aside for a moment the fact that it was unsigned. I'm just not that concerned about that.

Because I trust that you would let me know if you didn't think this had anything to do with the relationship between the parties.

And the first thing I want to say about the contract with Rasky is that it was signed and it was entered into after the litigation that we're here talking about began. So at the time you wrote this contract, you being VNA, with Rasky, you knew you were facing litigation. It had been filed months earlier in 2016. Yet there's no mention of the word litigation in the contract anywhere.

So as I understand it, Rasky -- and I'm assuming that because we don't have a contract for Mercury, I'll just assume a similar type of contract or a type of oral agreement was entered into with Mercury. And it's absolutely not for the purposes of assisting in litigation, advising in litigation, drafting litigation documents or anything of that nature.

I also looked -- it also has a scope of work. And there's going to be an hourly basis. It's going to be 250 dollars per hour or whatever else is agreed upon. And I think ultimately there's a different fee here.

But in the scope of work, which I think is critical -- when you look at all of the data breach litigation and I think that -- I don't think either side pointed me to too much of that litigation. But there's a really helpful case out of the -- two or three helpful cases out of the Eastern District of Virginia. And one of them is In re Dominion Dental Service v Inc. Data Breach Litigation.

The reason this type of litigation is helpful is because when a company has a data breach, they hire a forensic expert. They often hire a PR company so that the public knows target. I read the Target litigation, the Experian data breach litigation.

And then the issue becomes were the communications with those third parties protected or not. And what the courts look to in every instance is the scope of work. What were these consultants there to do? And here the program name is Flint Crisis Work and Proactive PR Support.

So there's nothing related to litigation there. The program overview, PR support related to the Flint media crisis. So here it's clear it's not the Flint litigation crisis. It's the media crisis that understandably your client

is concerned about its public reputation during this time period. So it says program overview is about the media crisis, ongoing media relations support for proactive visibility efforts.

So these two media companies are going to help VNA be proactive, move forward with a positive image. The scope of work says crisis PR counsel in support related to Flint, media relations, and content and message development. It starts September 1 of 2016 and can continue as needed. And there's a retainer and then had the hourly fee.

So the question becomes whether these employees, despite the scope of work -- I'm willing to go beyond what Dominion Dental Services instructs -- and that's 429 F.Supp.3d 190 -- and all of those cases to just let's look at reality.

And here the nature of the litigation is about the engineering services, a professional negligence case relating to engineering services that related to water chemistry.

The Rasky and Mercury companies are not engineers.

They're not water professionals. And they never represented

VNA at a substantive meeting about what its water consulting

or engineering work had included. And there is nothing in the

statement of work that otherwise indicates they're serving as

a paralegal or consulting or legal strategy.

In some instances, they were told about we have three

options in one for how to respond to a judge's ruling on a pending motion. If we win, let's go with this statement. If we lose, let's go with this statement. And then let's have a proactive -- you know things of that nature. But it's not in no way were those media companies analyzing the pending litigation to advise VNA on whether you're likely to win or lose or some third thing, whatever that might be.

So I do not see anything in what's before me that would indicate that these companies had become integrated into VNA and were, in essence, working there.

The other thing that I've looked at is In re Signet Jewelers Limited Securities Litigation. And he let me tell you a little bit about that. Because it comes out the opposite of the Copper Litigation. It's another Southern District of New York case, 2019. Quite current.

The corporation there had hired two PR firms. That's similar. Following the publication of articles accusing the corporation of fraud. There's no fraud allegation, but negligence is the allegation here. That counsel retained these PR firms while the corporation faced, quote, a series of media crises that plagued the company for several years.

Then Signet's management along with its in-house and outside counsel and PR firms, quote, formed a strategic communication strategy committee which convened to discuss communications strategy to neutralize the climate of negative

and often inaccurate media coverage in light of the legal and reputational risks facing the company. And plaintiff moved to compel those documents in the same manner as plaintiffs have here.

The court conducted an in camera review of certain exhibits containing various emails as well as the privilege logs. And after reviewing those communications, the court held that, quote, "Nothing in the client's communications for the former purpose constitutes the obtaining of advice or justifies a privileged status." The court mentioned that it looked at -- it would have merited a privilege status if a PR employee had been the functional equivalent of a Signet employee.

Here VNA has a robust I think it's a vice president level communications department. Or two, if the PR firm had been hired to perform a specific -- quote, specific litigation task that the attorneys needed to accomplish in order to advance their litigation. And -- or if they had conducted a media campaign in an effort to paint the target in a favorable light so that the prosecutors -- this is related to a case the court cited about grand jury subpoenas might feel less pressure to indict.

But here, Rasky and Mercury are not trying to influence the Court in what they're doing like the PR firm in grand jury case. They're trying to influence the public's

view of your client VNA.

So and because there in the Signet case, the court reasoned that the PR firm did not fit into those categories that the defendant had relied on and the documents were not sent to or shared for the purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice and, therefore, were not privileged.

So let me take a look at where that leaves us. I having looked at all of these documents with respect to 40 of the 60 documents that were provided to me, VNA I find has failed to meet its burden of showing that those documents were either privileged in the first instance.

Because what the problem is as I read the documents, a great many of those 40 documents are created for the purpose of seeking -- or they're communicated with Mercury and Rasky for the purpose of a media campaign and not related to the litigation. Now certainly the media campaign was desirable because of ongoing litigation, but that didn't mean that Mercury and Rasky were involved in the litigation.

So and let me -- so in the first instance, I don't think those work product privileged documents were ever work product. And in the second instance with respect to the attorney-client privilege, to the extent that VNA lawyers in some instances and communication director copied Mercury and Rasky, I think they waived the privilege.

That was not inadvertent. It's very clear in the

email that they want Mercury and Rasky's expertise and finessing the public message.

Now of the 20, I just want to make we're kind of clear on what's going on here. Of the 20 that I think are privileged, 17 of those originated from VNA's selection and three from plaintiffs' counsel. If you're just sort of keeping track of that level of detail.

And so what I think we need to do now is this is essentially the decision that I've been able to make having done the research, reviewed the documents, and sorted out who all of the people are who are copied on the documents.

So what I would ask VNA to do is understand that the rule that I'm announcing to you at this point is that the documents that are part of a media campaign simply aren't privileged. Those need to be turned over of your 1,700.

Documents that are copied from in-house counsel or others to Mercury and Rasky, the privilege is waived.

And what I could do is ask you to turn those documents over in a reasonable -- there's a lot -- 1,700 is a lot. So I'll give you some time to go through those. If you think you would like the assistance of further in camera review of the 1,600, whatever we've got, 30 left, I would appoint -- I have some ideas about this.

I would appoint either Deborah Greenspan or I've already appointed Mona Majzoub for the purpose -- former

Magistrate Judge Mona Majzoub for the purposes of working on settlement issues. She served our court as a hardworking magistrate, looked at attorney-client privileged issues constantly, and could jump in and work on this.

So I want to give you a chance to think about that and see whether you think you need that assistance. If we did employ or use Special Master either Deborah and Mona Majzoub or one or the other, I would require that VNA cover two thirds of the cost of that and plaintiffs' counsel one third. And I base that only on the fact that 40 out of 60, two thirds of the documents were not privileged in the first place or the privilege was clearly waived.

I don't think this is a close call from my perspective. So it just seems fair that the plaintiffs shouldn't bear a 50/50 percent of that cost if a special master is needed.

So Mr. Olsen, how much -- how do you -- do you want to take the first crack?

MR. OLSEN: Can I make a couple of comments? The answer to your question will be yes, but a couple of comments.

With all due respect, Your Honor, I think you're applying an extremely narrow reading of this issue that's not consistent with the case law. With respect to the functional equivalence test, I certainly agree that's what most courts use in evaluating this question. But the courts are not

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making that decision based on whether you have no PR
      capabilities in the U.S., like you said in Sumitomo. Or
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      whether there's no one who could provide that assistance.
               I mean, if you look at GSK, which is one of the
 4
 5
      leading cases in this, FPC v GSK.
 6
               THE COURT:
                           I did.
 7
                          The way they describe it is the way most
               MR. OLSEN:
      of these cases describe it, which is are the third parties
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 9
      working in the same manner as they did with full-time
      employees. Are they part of the team and working with
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11
      full-time PR employees in a similar way?
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               I don't think there's any way that you could conclude
      that that isn't the case here where these third party PR
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      consultants were working in a very similar way as the
14
15
      full-time PR people were working.
16
               And the other point you made with respect to the fact
17
      that these are PR people doing PR things and not providing or
18
      assisting with providing legal advice in particular, I also
      don't think that's at all the standard in this case law.
19
20
               If you look at Sumitomo, which you talked about, or
      In re Copper Antitrust Litigation, when you hire a PR firm to
21
22
      do PR things, to deal with public relations problems following
23
      the exposure of a scandal that gave rise to that very same
24
      litigation, that court concluded when they're doing PR things,
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not legal things, that there is no waiver when they're

25

consulting with lawyers to help understand those legal issues, which is exactly the same thing that happened here.

Certainly these PR firms were hired to do PR things, but that doesn't mean that there's a waiver or there was no purpose with respect to a legal issue and it was fundamentally a media campaign. They clearly, if you look at those documents that reviewed in camera, were working in connection with the lawyers to understand the litigation and providing -- and working with those lawyers with respect to work product and legal advice.

Having said that, I understand your direction. And yes, I think we need a little time to evaluate the implication of this. There are a couple of issues. For example, the in camera review documents you looked at were from 2016 and 2017. There was a very -- a much more recent production of 2019 documents that relate to the guardian article, for example, where I think the issues may be different with respect to a PR firm.

But yeah, we need to go through and evaluate how many of those 1,700 documents did copy PR firms on them and evaluate whether we need additional guidance or help. And we take your suggestions and we will get back to you as soon as we can get through those voluminous documents with respect to what we think the next step should be.

In Re Flint Water Cases - Case No. 16-10444

THE COURT: Okay. How much time do you need to get

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back to me?
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 2
               MR. OLSEN: Can we have three weeks?
 3
               THE COURT: Yeah. And then what I would ask is that
 4
     you have a meet and confer with Mr. Stern and Ms. Daly so that
 5
     when you get back to the Court in three weeks, I would know
 6
     what your plan is for producing the documents and whether you
 7
     need the assistance of a third party.
 8
               And if so, who you recommend that that third party
 9
     be. Aside from myself, which I don't think you would be
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      recommending anyway. I don't think you're satisfied with the
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      outcome that's been reached so far. So and I just don't have
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     the time to go through all of those.
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               So what -- so if you can get all of that done in the
14
     next three weeks, that would be very good. Where are we?
15
      Today is the 19th. So we're talking about August 9th.
16
               MR. OLSEN:
                          Okay.
17
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Good.
18
               MR. OLSEN:
                          Your Honor, that isn't all of the issues
19
     with respect to item 4.
                               I think --
20
               THE COURT: Oh, okay. What else -- right.
21
               MR. OLSEN: We should probably talk about -- and
22
     Ms. Daly can disagree, but I don't think she will. With
23
      respect to the PR --
24
               THE COURT: Well, let me just see whether Ms. Daly
25
      and Mr. Stern have anything to say about the three-week period
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and this process that I've proposed.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, I don't have any issue -- we don't have any issue with the three weeks. The process makes sense. But I just would like a little bit of time to digest. You gave a very thorough ruling orally. And you know, I just would like a little time to digest it. I can't think of anything instinctively or off the top of my that is jumping out at me about it. But we appreciate the thoroughness that the Court -- with which the Court conducted this evaluation.

And within the next three weeks, but certainly sooner if there are any issues with the process described, we'll be sure to let the Court know. And Ms. Daly may have -- you know, she may have thoughts from having heard this that I didn't have, so.

THE COURT: And let me add one thing that looking back at my notes, the factors for the functional equivalent that I had -- that I was reviewing when I was discussing the Copper Litigation actually come from the Bieter case, B-i-e-t-e-r, which the Copper Litigation court relied upon. And that's B-i-e-t-e-r, 16 F.3d 929.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, one thing that does jump -thank you. One thing that does jump out to me in -- to the
extent you've already reviewed 60 documents and have made a
decision on 40 of them, that they are not privileged --

THE COURT: Or made a decision on all 20 of them -- I

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mean, all 60 of them.
 2
               MR. STERN:
                          Right.
 3
               THE COURT: Twenty of them were I think were
 4
      legitimately withheld as privileged.
 5
                          Sure. I'm curious about whether we can
               MR. STERN:
 6
      now have those 40 since that would not require another review
 7
      by anybody since -- because we haven't seen any of these
 8
      documents.
 9
               THE COURT:
                          Right.
               MR. STERN: And the fact that 17 out of the 20 that
10
11
      were privileged came from VNA, I may have some thoughts about
12
      the division of payment to a special master. But
13
      notwithstanding any of that, you know, can we get the 40
      immediately that have been submitted to the Court that Your
14
15
      Honor has ruled are not privileged or protected in another
16
      way?
17
               THE COURT:
                           Sure. I don't have any problem with
18
      that.
19
               MR. STERN:
                           Thank you.
20
               THE COURT: I'll just need to put it in an orderly
21
      non scribbled fashion.
22
               MR. STERN: Understood.
23
               THE COURT: So we'll get it to you.
24
               MR. STERN:
                          No problem. Thank you.
25
               THE COURT:
                          I mean, I'll get the list to Mr. Olsen
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1
      and he'll produce the documents to you.
               MR. STERN: Okay.
 2
                                  Thank you.
 3
               MS. DALY: Your Honor --
 4
               MR. OLSEN: So the only thing I was going to say is
 5
      with respect to this plaintiffs' fourth amended RP topic and
 6
      the PR discovery topic, and I take the privilege issue is
 7
      going to take some further time as you've just outlined. But
 8
      other than that, I think we all agree based on the meet and
 9
      confer yesterday that there is no additional data or
      information that plaintiffs are looking for with respect to
10
11
      these issues.
12
               And on the May 17 conference, you had suggested that
13
      time had come for plaintiffs to demonstrate what they think
      they've learned from these months and months and months of
14
15
      discovery. And whether there's anything they think is here
16
      with respect to targeting jurors. And what the Court should
17
      do about it if they think so.
18
               Obviously you've heard from me before.
                                                       I have a
19
      fundamentally different view. And I think all of this
20
      discovery has demonstrated that not only was the Detroit News
21
      article wrong, but there was absolutely no targeting.
22
               But given that, I think we're in the same place with
23
      respect to there are no outstanding document or data issues
24
      with respect to this issue except for the PR stuff, which we
25
      will proceed as you just directed, I think it's time for you
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to set a deadline for Mr. Stern and Ms. Daly to get you whatever their expert affidavit or whatever they want to submit that outlines what their findings are. Because this should be over in terms of this PR discovery endeavor.

And I don't know if you want to hear about

Ms. Flotteron's deposition today. That's another Actum

deponent that Mr. Stern has noticed up. Now she doesn't have

any firsthand knowledge about the Flint Water Crisis. Her

role was to watch the trial on Zoom and compose Tweets that

were posted to the Flint Facts Twitter account.

And Mr. McKeon was already deposed about those issues. And that deposition often strayed into a debate or an argument about the merits of what was in the Tweets substantively and what should or should not have been said, which obviously doesn't have anything to do with whether or not there was any targeting here.

So we don't think this should keep going absent what you directed in May, which is plaintiffs' counsel showing or making a showing as to what they've learned here so that you can evaluate whether this should go any farther.

MR. STERN: May I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STERN: I always appreciate Mr. Olsen's advocacy.

I disagree with everything that he just said.

I disagree with the characterization of what Your

Honor said at the last hearing. I disagree with his description of what a witness that he doesn't represent may say or what her knowledge is. They don't have standing under the law to object to this deposition.

We've met and conferred with her attorney who appears willing to produce her for a deposition under certain caveats and scope of the deposition. I have a completely different reading of having taken Mr. McKeon's deposition about what this witness will testify about.

And the Twitter issue and the Dynamic ads issue and all of those issues, while they are interrelated, they are not exclusive of one another.

Your Honor asked during the trial if any of the lawyers at trial knew about that Twitter account. You asked right in front of me. I raised it. It was very spontaneous. And every one of them said no. And yet we found out during the deposition of Mr. McKeon that there were lawyers from at least Mayer Brown who were integrally involved in providing information to Actum to help produce the Tweets that were being put out during the trial.

Mr. McKeon was a supervisor. He was essentially the manager of the team. But he didn't remember a single Tweet that he had composed himself or where the information had come from. And what we will ultimately be seeking as a result of all of this primarily is prospective relief.

Mr. Leopold and Mr. Novak have a trial starting in February along with Veolia. To the extent that there was anything that happened during the first bellwether trial that the Court may find to not have been appropriate, it shouldn't happen again in the next trial and it shouldn't happen in the trial after that.

Notwithstanding that, we need some time -- they just produced this morning the final tranche of documents that our expert asked for with regard to doing a full accounting and evaluation of what happened with the Dynamic ads.

Literally three hours ago, we got the production, which is password protected, and we immediately sent it to him. So to say the time has come for us to show our cards and to turn over our hand, maybe. Probably. But we should at least have, first, the opportunity to review the most new tranche of documents that just came our way this morning with that regard.

Your Honor's had the affidavit of their expert for two months now and have not seen anything yet from our expert. So we'd like the opportunity for him to look at those documents. We would like to provide a declaration or an affidavit from him to the extent he thinks that anything was done was actually done inappropriately or with the purpose of targeting jurors or the public at large.

So if three weeks was enough time to review the

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issues associated with the privilege log, we'd ask for the
same amount of time for our expert to at least review the new
documents that came in. We're happy to at that point in time
provide Your Honor with a report from him or an affidavit from
him to the extent that he has an opinion that differs from
Veolia's expert's opinion.
         Again, I've never once said in one of these hearings,
in writing, anywhere, that Veolia tried to manipulate jurors
and the trial was subverted by that process. I read an
article that I had no role in from the Detroit News that was
well --
         THE COURT: I understand.
         MR. STERN: So that's why we are with that. So those
are two issues. There's the Twitter issue and then there's
the Dynamic ads issue.
         Now, if I may, there is an interplay between the
Twitter account and Dynamic ads. And so they are obviously
         But for the next trial, if there are lawyers
participating in a Twitter account that's providing
information to the public that's false, that may be something
that we seek the Court's intervention on. If there's a
Dynamic ads campaign that's either related to or independent
from --
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THE COURT:

MR. STERN:

Okay.

Yeah.

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1
               THE COURT: Good.
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               MR. LEOPOLD: Your Honor?
 3
               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. LEOPOLD: I don't mean to weigh into all of this
     because I know it's been primarily the personal injury case,
 5
 6
     bellwether case that Mr. Stern tried along with the
 7
     defendants. But I must say that what Mr. Stern said a moment
8
      ago --
 9
               THE COURT: I don't know -- okay.
10
               MR. LEOPOLD: I'm sorry?
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               THE COURT: When you said the personal injury, you
     mean -- I understood but --
12
              MR. LEOPOLD: The bellwether individual cases --
13
14
               THE COURT: Yeah.
15
               MR. LEOPOLD: -- that he tried where these issues,
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      you know, arose. But what Mr. Stern said I think is very
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      important that moving forward for the next trials, not only
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      the information that has been discussed here today but just
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      looking still to this day, you know, they have these websites
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     up trying to hit the community that are extremely misleading
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      and are misquoting you, others. I just think these are issues
22
      that have to be addressed.
23
               We're going to have to address them with the jury to
24
     make sure that none of the jurors look at these websites that
25
      are so misleading about, you know, lawyers -- bad lawyers in
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this case and stealing the client's monies. It's just very
 2
     bad things. We have to address them at some point in time.
 3
               THE COURT: Well, the only way that I address things
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      is when a motion is brought to me. When an issue is
 5
      identified by a lawyer through a formal process of either
 6
     getting it on an agenda. But ideally, I can't just in -- writ
 7
      large I can't just say, okay, everybody say nice things about
 8
     everybody. I can't do that. So what --
 9
              MR. LEOPOLD: No. We're past that stage, Your Honor.
10
     But I do think we can raise it with a motion. But all of
11
     these issues are intertwined.
12
               THE COURT: Of course they are.
13
              MR. LEOPOLD: And they've been talked about for
14
     months.
15
               THE COURT: But bring to my attention what are the
16
      communications, who's making them, when are they -- where are
17
      they, when are they. Just tell me more. That's all I'm
18
     asking you to do.
19
               MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, I don't think we -- I agree
20
     with Mr. Stern. There's no reason we need to debate these
21
      issues. All I was asking for is what you were asking for in
22
     May.
23
               THE COURT:
                          Right.
24
               MR. OLSEN:
                          Which he suggested he will do.
25
               THE COURT:
                          Exactly.
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MR. OLSEN:
                    Which is if we're getting an expert
affidavit or a statement or whatever, let's get it.
all I'm saying.
         THE COURT:
                     Good.
                    So if I may? What I anticipate doing,
         MR. STERN:
Your Honor, is providing that affidavit and I believe it would
be followed with a motion to the -- I don't know what the
affidavit's going to say.
         THE COURT:
                    Right.
                    So I can't tell you that I'm seeking
         MR. STERN:
relief if nothing happened. But I'd like to have the
opportunity to work with the expert to get his opinion.
there is an opinion that supports anything from that article
or anything that we believe now may have happened, that we
then have the opportunity to seek relief from the court,
primarily prospectively and perhaps retroactively depending on
what he says.
         But again, I'm operating under the assumption that
everything that has happened has been above board and with the
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But again, I'm operating under the assumption that everything that has happened has been above board and with the hope that our expert comes to me and says nothing happened here. This was a wild goose chase. You shouldn't have gone on it. I'm sorry you had to pay me money. I'm glad I had the opportunity to review it, but nothing happened. Nothing would make me happier than to hear that. I swear to -- I swear on everything holy.

THE COURT: Good. Okay. So what we'll do, this is a good plan then. In three weeks on this issue, Mr. Stern and Ms. Daly will provide a summary of what your discovery has shown so far with respect to the Dynamic search ad, alleged campaign, Twitter and all of those issues. If there is something you think you still need and anything that your expert can say so far that would convince me that this is worth continuing to pursue.

And then if you have a motion, because you now have an expert who can say something, I don't know, is that enough time for your expert -- for you to draft your motion?

MR. STERN: I think we probably need at least two weeks once we get the report from our expert.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. STERN: And it may be that we can meet and confer with Veolia and tell them what the report says and they may agree to the relief that we would ultimately seek in a motion and there might not be a need for a motion.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

MR. STERN: And with regard to Ms. Flotteron's deposition, I firmly believe that it's necessary. I don't think Veolia has standing. Her lawyer seems willing to produce her. It's a very limited scope. And it's probably the last deposition that I will have to take or we will have to take related to the Twitter issue.

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Because as you might recall, we were first told that
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      it was Pierre Farcot in France. And then we were told that it
 3
      wasn't him. And then we were told that it mate may have been
 4
      someone named Jennifer, and it wasn't that person.
 5
               So now we know exactly who sat at a computer and on
 6
      their phone and typed these Tweets. No one that we have
 7
      talked to yet has done that. This is probably the last
 8
      deponent that we would have to take to get to the bottom of
 9
      the Twitter account, which is part and parcel with what we
10
      might ask for relief for going forward.
11
               And obviously if her attorney wants to move to quash
12
      the --
13
               THE COURT: And when is her deposition scheduled for?
                          It's August 5, I think. Melanie, is that
14
               MR. STERN:
15
      right?
16
                          That's close. August 8th and 9th now.
               MS. DALY:
17
               MR. STERN:
                          August 8th, yeah.
18
               THE COURT:
                                  And I got an email from Ms. Devine
                           Okay.
19
      related to this. Mr. Olsen, are you addressing it?
20
               MR. OLSEN: I'm not sure what the email is. All I
21
      know is we had a brief communication with her lawyer when they
22
      were evaluating whether or not to move to quash that
23
      deposition. I don't know if they will or they won't.
24
      beyond the pale in terms of cumulative of all these issues
25
      we've been dealing with for months and months and months.
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certainly wouldn't want this to be an excuse to delay the
 2
      process you just outlined for getting a submission on what
 3
     plaintiffs think they found here, if anything. And if --
               THE COURT: You're the first person CC'd on the
 4
 5
     email.
 6
               MR. OLSEN: Oh, I just don't know which email you're
 7
     talking about.
 8
               THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm talking about Ms. Devine's
 9
     email to Leslie Calhoun trying to get me to address it.
10
               MR. OLSEN: Where Ms. Devine suggested that that
11
      shouldn't go forward. I've already articulated that position
12
     today.
13
               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. OLSEN: I don't know if Actum's counsel or -- she
14
15
     doesn't work at Actum anymore. Whether her counsel's going to
     move to quash or not. I don't think absent the process you
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17
      just described, I would think see what Mr. Stern's expert and
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     Mr. Stern and Ms. Daly have to say and then you can evaluate
19
     whether this dep is necessary.
20
               MR. STERN: Except the problem is --
21
               THE COURT: If Flotteron -- wait, how do we say her
22
     name?
23
               MR. STERN: Flotteron.
24
               THE COURT: Flotteron. If Flotteron isn't moving to
25
      quash the subpoena for the deposition, let's just get it done.
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Then in three weeks we're going to find out whether we go any
 2
      further with this subject. And then that will be that.
 3
               MR. STERN:
                          Thank you, Judge.
 4
               THE COURT: And Mr. Leopold, if on behalf of class
 5
     plaintiffs you want to file -- make a filing or make a
 6
      recommendation regarding media leading up to or statements
 7
      leading up to the trial or during the trial, this next
 8
     three-week period would be a good time for you to get that in
 9
     as well unless something comes to your attention after that.
10
               MR. LEOPOLD: I appreciate that, Your Honor. It is a
11
      little bit -- as you can appreciate, a little bit different
12
     dealing with the class issues because communicating with class
     members is different than others. But we will look at that
13
14
      issue and perhaps file a motion.
15
               THE COURT: Yeah, it's different in terms of
16
     plaintiffs' responsibility. But I think the defendants, do
17
      they -- they have the same --
18
               MR. LEOPOLD: Can't communicate with the class
19
     members, Your Honor.
20
               THE COURT: No. Of course not. But they can -- they
21
     can communicate in the world about --
22
               MR. LEOPOLD: Yeah. That's --
23
               THE COURT: -- the existence of their company or
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     something like that.
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               MR. LEOPOLD: Certainly, yes. But I understand what
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you're saying. I think we're on the same wavelength.

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they say, so long as it's hopefully accurate and appropriate.
What I see thus far has been a little bit out of the box.
we'll address the issue.
         THE COURT: Okay.
                      There's a lot of cases dealing with
         MR. LEOPOLD:
these issues on class matters.
         THE COURT: Good. Good.
                                   Okay.
         I did get an email regarding I think the July 25 slot
for a discovery conference regarding Veolia's response to
plaintiffs' fifth request for production of documents and
accompanying privilege assertions.
         MR. STERN: We have not yet conferred about it.
         THE COURT:
                    Oh.
         MR. STERN: It wouldn't be right for you to talk now
-- for us -- obviously you should talk about whatever you
      But I don't think there's been an opportunity for us to
confer about it.
         This ruling today may actually have implications on
those objections that we've now, you know, raised with Veolia.
So we're committed to continuing to work with them in light of
the Court's ruling and even prior to the Court's ruling to see
if there's a way that we can resolve it.
         And we can let the Court know prior to -- I guess
it's a week from -- I guess it's a week from now.
                                                   But we have
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not yet heard back from them regarding our communications
 2
      about the -- our perceived insufficiencies in their most
 3
     recent privilege log.
 4
               THE COURT: Can you let us know before Monday? I'm
 5
      just trying to schedule.
 6
               MR. STERN: We're happy to let you know.
 7
      just ask that if it's possible for the Veolia counsel to get
 8
     back with us, you know, sometime before noon Monday for a meet
 9
     and confer so we can make a determination about what the
10
     position is there, then we'd be able to let the Court know.
11
     But as of now, we believe the ball is in the Veolia's
12
     defendant's court, so to speak.
13
               MR. OLSEN: That's fine, Your Honor.
14
               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right.
15
               Well, thanks very much. And I'm not sure if I'll see
16
     you on the 25th. But the next conference is when, Leslie?
      It's not on a Wednesday I think.
17
18
               MR. STERN: I think it's Tuesday. The 25th is a
19
     Tuesday if that's what you're referring to.
20
               THE COURT: Yeah, that one. But what's the next
21
     August?
22
                          Oh, we still are looking at the calendar
               THE CLERK:
23
     for August.
24
               THE COURT: What was that Leslie?
25
               THE CLERK: I said we need to still look at the
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calendar.
 1
               THE COURT: Oh, no wonder I can't find it. Okay.
 2
 3
      Good.
             We'll do that.
 4
               Thank you everyone. Take care.
 5
                           (Proceedings Concluded)
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                   CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
 9
             I, Jeseca C. Eddington, Federal Official Court
10
     Reporter, do hereby certify the foregoing 50 pages are a true
11
     and correct transcript of the above entitled proceedings.
12
      /s/ JESECA C. EDDINGTON_
                                                            07/25/2023
      Jeseca C. Eddington, RDR, RMR, CRR, FCRR
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